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AFRICA REVIEW

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NOTE: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.

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Kenya: Moi and the Politics of Succession

The succession of Daniel arap Moi to the full powers of Kenya's late President Jomo Kenyatta will be complete next week. The process has gone smoothly--a result of skillful behind-the-scenes planning--and the country appears calm and unified behind its new leader. Moi has indicated that he does not intend to institute major changes before the general election next year, but he is stressing tribal reconciliation and taking measures against corruption.

The next major step in the succession process will be the meeting today of the Kenya African National Union, Kenya's only political party. The meeting will ratify Moi's nomination to the party presidency; he has already been certified as the only candidate for this post. Moi will then be nominated as the party's choice for President of Kenya.

When the party deposits notice of its decision with the Attorney General on Tuesday, that official plans to declare Moi the unopposed candidate and rule that an election is unnecessary. Moi will be sworn in on 14 October to complete the final year of Kenyatta's term.

Two key steps will remain--appointment of a national Vice President and election of a party chairman. In dealing with these, Moi will for the first time have to address directly the tribal sensitivities that are Kenya's most serious problem.

It is virtually certain that Moi will appoint Finance Minister Kibaki, a Nyeri Kikuyu, to the vice presidency. Kibaki is a member of the triumvirate--along with Attorney General Njonjo, a Kiambu Kikuyu, and Moi, a member of the small Kalenjin tribal group--that largely directed the government during Kenyatta's final days and has been virtually unchallenged during the transitional period. Kibaki's acknowledged competence and his broad-based popularity are likely to win him acceptance from both factions of the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest and most important

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tribe, and also from members of other tribes, even though they are wary of continued Kikuyu aggrandizement.

Moi reportedly wants to name a member of the Luo, Kenya's second largest tribe, as party chairman. In view of the party's inactivity over the past few years, such a step would be largely symbolic. It would, however, signal the return of the Luos from the political wilderness. They have been effectively deprived of influence since 1969, when their leader Oginga Odinga--then serving as Kenya's Vice President and ranking along with Kenyatta as one of the country's founding fathers--was arrested for forming an opposition party for which he allegedly accepted foreign financial support.

Some Luos are still holding out for Odinga's rehabilitation, but others have accommodated to new realities, leaving the tribe badly split. A disputed takeover this summer of the Luo tribal welfare association by a group loyal to Moi rather than to Odinga has led to a bitter court suit. Finding an acceptable Luo to become party chairman may thus prove more difficult than Moi anticipates; there are reports of some cooperation between pro-Odinga Luos and the Kenyatta family faction of Kikuyus to counter Moi.

Before Kenyatta's death in August, most observers predicted that the small group of Kiambu Kikuyus close to his family would make a stronger bid for power than they have. Their efforts over the past few years to strengthen their hold on the levers of power have been consistently stymied, however, and Kenyatta's death caught them unprepared to act. Most have acquired business and land holdings sufficient to support them in ease and in the process have become personally unpopular. During the transitional period, they have either withdrawn from the political scene or professed support for the new regime.

Much of Moi's time has been taken up receiving regional and professional delegations eager to join the bandwagon of support of the new regime. Sincere or not, these declarations of loyalty have had the effect of demonstrating a nearly unanimous approval of the succession.

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Moi has tried to reassure the Kenyan people that he does not intend to make any major changes soon. His one definite act thus far has been to announce a halt to land transfers. The move is popular because rampant abuses involving such transfers had reached the level of political scandal. Otherwise, Moi has confined his pronouncements largely to exhortations to rise above tribal considerations, to avoid even the appearance of political conspiracy, to eliminate corruption, and to work for the country's development.

Some political leaders have already begun to look beyond the succession to the parliamentary and presidential elections that must be held next year. Jockeying for places on the ballot had started even before Kenyatta died and is likely to increase sharply in the coming months. The team of Moi, Njonjo, and Kibaki will probably seek to avoid controversy until it has a chance to secure its position with an electoral mandate. (SECRET)

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Recent Political Changes in Djibouti

The recent change in government in Djibouti seems to have been primarily a product of differences between President Gouled, an ethnic Issa, and former Prime Minister Kamil, an ethnic Afar, rather than an attempt to deal effectively with the country's problems. To replace Kamil, Gouled has selected Barkat Gourad, an old-line Afar politician and reputed playboy with no discernible appetite for taking on responsibilities that might jeopardize his nonvoting membership in the French Senate. Barkat was probably acceptable to Gouled largely because he has no serious political ambitions and, therefore, poses little threat to Gouled's authority.

The problems between Gouled and Kamil had been simmering for some months, owing mainly to the President's unwillingness to share authority with his Prime Minister. They came to a head in the late summer because of Kamil's largely unilateral efforts to facilitate setting up a Soviet Embassy in Djibouti and his behavior as head of the Djiboutian delegation to the celebrations in Addis Ababa, marking the fourth anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution, where he cut other Djiboutian delegates out of his meetings with Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and assorted groups of Djiboutian dissidents. Gouled dismissed Kamil's government on the morning after Kamil returned from Addis Ababa.

The prospects for Barkat's government will depend in part on how amenable Barkat is to accepting Gouled's leadership. He may find that as the leading Afar in the government, he will be unable to avoid pressures to represent Afar interests, which, in turn, may arouse Issa suspicions.

The makeup of the new cabinet, like that of its predecessor, is designed both to maintain the delicate tribal balance between the Somali-oriented Issas and Ethiopian-oriented Afars and to be acceptable to Ethiopia and Somalia. Both Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa have their

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potentially troublesome surrogates in Djibouti and maintain a careful watch on political developments there. Ethiopia depends on the Djibouti - Addis Ababa railway for its only rail outlet to the sea, while Mogadiscio has long considered Djibouti as part of Greater Somalia.

Barkat, like Gouled, may be wary of allowing a Soviet Embassy in Djibouti, and the French diplomatic adviser to the Djiboutian presidency has also been working to delay the arrival of the Soviets. Barkat claims to be "pro-American," and he apparently thinks Djibouti has missed chances for obtaining Western and international economic aid by identifying too closely with the Arab states.

The new government may be short-lived. The experiences of the Kamil government over its seven months in office and of that of Kamil's predecessor, Dini, tend to suggest that any Afar Prime Minister will have a hard time remaining acceptable to Gouled. Gouled's own reputation, on the other hand, may suffer from his appointment of Barkat. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Nigeria: The Bureaucracy and Future Civilian Rule

With only a year to go before the Nigerian military relinquishes power in October 1979, a substantial portion of the federal civil service is distinctly unenthusiastic about the prospect of civilian rule. Then bureaucrats recognize that the special position the senior civil service has enjoyed under military rule is likely to erode under a civilian political system based on party and interest group competition.

The civil service by itself is not in a position to impede or sabotage Nigeria's transition to civilian rule. Many public servants, however, might quietly support a coup intended to forestall civilian government if one should be mounted in the months ahead by a dissident faction of the ruling military council or by ambitious middle grade officers.

The federal civil service has done very well during the 12 years of military rule, with the ranking heads of the bureaucracy enjoying elite social and economic status and often substantial political authority. The military leaders' comparative inexperience with the process of governing, coupled with their long suppression of civilian political activity, has made the higher civil service considerably more important than it was under civilian rule in the early 1960s. In effect, with the military relying heavily on the bureaucracy to run the country, the civil service has come to occupy a preferred, and at times an unchallengeable, position.

At present there is a military-bureaucratic monopoly of power, and many public servants have never worked in a civilian administrative environment. Under the military, the civil service has generally functioned as the principal upward conduit for policy proposals and the downward channel for policy execution, with the most basic policy decisions being reserved for the small group that constitutes the ruling military council. Economic decisions in particular have been the province

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of senior civil servants, whose technical expertise often gives them a decisive voice. This cozy and long-standing relationship between the military and civil servants has politicized the latter's work to an extent previously unknown and has had the effect of creating considerable civil service support for the continuation of military government.

A major and psychologically difficult transformation in the mentality of the civil service will be needed to prepare the federal bureaucracy to operate Nigeria's anticipated civilian government. It will have to adapt to the prospect of becoming the executor rather than the originator of public policy and of doing so in a nonpartisan manner. The bureaucracy will have to share political power with other competing groups such as presidential advisers, political appointees, legislative committees, and the press. Furthermore, it will be subject to all the stresses and strains of public debate and party politics that are inevitable in a democratic system of government. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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MALI: Though Bamako had been rife with rumors of a coup attempt to coincide with the 22 September national day, the festivities marking 18 years of Malian independence went off without a hitch. During the parade, more than half the SAM-3s in Mali were displayed on their launch carriers. Soviet military equipment deliveries to Mali had previously been kept secret, and the unprecedented display of the missiles indicates these weapons are intended more to bolster the government's prestige rather than serve military purposes. President Moussa Traore was advanced to the rank of brigadier general, and the other members of the ruling military committee were promoted to colonel, a reminder to those who attempted Traore's overthrow in February that his control is as tight as ever. The promotions also placate his colleagues who fully anticipate a loss of prestige with the advent of civilian rule in 1979. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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COMOROS: As part of its effort to clear up its ambiguous political position, the Comoros voted last Sunday in a constitutional referendum to establish a federal republic. The proposal was adopted, according to press reports, by 99.3 percent of the 187,000 voters on the archipelago's three main islands. Mayotte, a fourth island in the group that chose to become an overseas department of France in 1975, did not participate in the referendum. Ahmed Abdallah--a co-President in the ruling Political Directorate--is likely to run unopposed in the coming presidential election now that his fellow co-President Mohamed Ahmed has resigned. Abdallah last week relieved Bob Denard of his post as head of the armed forces; Denard is the French mercenary who led the coup that toppled the radical regime of Ali Soilih and brought the Political Directorate to power four months ago. The Political Directorate has received widespread criticism from African countries over its close association with Denard. Abdallah, according to our reports, was advised by the French during his recent visit to Paris to end Denard's involvement in the islands' government. Abdallah's dismissal of Denard is intended to demonstrate to other countries that the Comoros Government is clearly run by local civilians and not by foreign mercenaries. (SECRET) [REDACTED]

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LIBERIA-CUBA: President Tolbert has rejected a recent Cuban request to open an embassy in Monrovia. Tolbert instructed Foreign Minister Dennis to tell Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca that although Liberia wants to maintain communications with President Fidel Castro, it is inconvenient at this time to act on the Cuban request. Liberia and Cuba established diplomatic relations in 1974. Tolbert will probably continue to resist Havana's efforts to open an embassy, at least until the Cuban military presence in Angola and Ethiopia is reduced considerably. The strongly pro-Western Tolbert is alarmed by what he sees as Cuban-Soviet "expansionism" in Africa. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON) [REDACTED] ORPA, [REDACTED]

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